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Abstract
This paper discusses and extends some competitive aspects of the games pro-
posed in an earlier work, where a robust railway network design problem was
proposed as a non-cooperative zero-sum game in normal form between a de-
signer/operator and an attacker. Due to the importance of the order of play
and the information available to the players at the moment of their decisions, we
here extend those previous models by proposing a formulation of this situation
as a dynamic game. Besides, we propose a new mathematical programming
model that optimizes both the network design and the allocation of security
resources over the network. The paper also proposes a model to distribute secu-
rity resources over an already existing railway network in order to minimize the
negative effects of an intentional attack. For the sake of readability, all concepts
are introduced with the help of an illustrative example.
Key words: Robust Network Design, Game Theory, Protection resource
allocation, Equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Terrorist attacks have often targeted collective transportation networks, spe-
cially railways. Examples of such attacks are numerous: 1995 Paris attack, 2004
Madrid train bombings, 2005 London bombings, 2010 Moscow metro bombings,
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to mention only a few. This is one of the reasons why the operators of these
transportation modes should:
• try to design a network that efficiently works in case one of its components
fails (the so-called robustness of the network), which is addressed in the
network design phase. In this paper we will consider that such failures are
provoked by intentional attacks.
• once the network is built, distribute the available security resources so
that the damage caused by potential attacks is minimized.
The robustness analysis of transportation networks has been widely analyzed
in the literature from different points of view. For instance, Laporte et al. (2011)
consider that a railway network is robust when passengers have several options to
reach their destination. Atamturk and Zhang (2007) and Ukkusuri et al. (2007)
consider robustness of a transportation network with respect to uncertainty in
the origin-destination matrix.
The relationship between game theory and robust transportation network
design has attracted lots of attention. A game is a decision process in which
several agents (called players) with possibly conflicting objectives converge. At
the end of the process each player receives a payoff, which may be affected by
the decision of other players. Roughly speaking, games can be divided into
two main branches: cooperative games, in which players are allowed to enforce
cooperative behavior; and noncooperative games, in which players compete and
no cooperation between them is allowed. The reader may consult Forgo¨ et al.
(1999) or Owen (1995) for a complete introduction to game theory. The models
presented in this paper follow a competitive scheme.
A non-cooperative game can be defined as follows: assume there are n play-
ers, and let Si be the set of possible strategies (decisions) available for player
i, i = 1, ..., n. Let (s1, . . . , sn) be a combination of strategies of the n players,
where si ∈ Si is the strategy chosen by player i. Let ui : S1 × ... × Sn be the
payoff function of player i, and therefore let ui(s1, . . . , sn) be the payoff received
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by player i if players act according to the strategies (s1, . . . , sn). This game can
be represented as
G = {S1, ..., Sn;u1, ..., un}.
Game theory has already been applied to model problems in transportation
(the reader is referred to Hollander and Prashker 2006 for a review of such ap-
plications). In a more recent paper, Lownes et al. (2011) presents an iterative
process for measuring network vulnerability to edge disruptions in a game be-
tween a router (who aims at minimizing travel costs) and a network tester (who
aims at maximizing travel costs by disabling network links).
Game theory has also been used to model and design defensive strategies
against intentional attacks in different settings. In Bier et al. (2007) a sequen-
tial situation in which one attacker can attack one of two locations protected by
one defender is modeled. They discuss on whether it is better to let the attacker
know your defense plans or not and they prove that, in equilibrium, it might
be optimal for the defender to leave locations unprotected. Bier et al. (2008)
discusses how to allocate a limited budget in order to defend multiple potential
targets (cities) and how such optimal allocation depends on: cost effectiveness
of security investments, how the defender values the potential targets and how
certain the attacker’s target valuation is. Golany et al. (2009) distinguishes be-
tween probabilistic defense, which aims at fighting chance, and strategic defense,
which aims at fighting intentional attacks. The authors prove that, under prob-
abilistic threats, one should invest security resources on priority sites, whereas
under intentional threats one should focus on decreasing the potential damage in
the most vulnerable sites. More recently, Bakir (2011) analyzes the problem of
allocating security resources to defend from an attacker the trajectory of cargo
containers and models this situation as a Stackelberg game. The author arrives
at a similar conclusion as this paper does: in equilibrium the defender should
keep a level of security at each site so that the expected damage is constant.
Our problem shares some features with the interdiction problem as intro-
duced in Wood (1993), in which the aim is to attack arcs on a capacitated
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network so that the maximum flow from a source s to a sink t is minimized.
Another interdiction problem is proposed in Scaparra and Church (2008), in
which protection resource allocation is tackled so that the effects of intentional
attacks on a system of facilities are minimized. More recently, Cappanera and
Scaparra (2011) consider networks subject to external disruptions in some of
their components that may cause traffic flow delays and propose an allocation
of resources that protect the shortest path between a supply node and a demand
node in such a way that hits on protected components have no effect. Their
trilevel defender-attacker-user model is reduced to a bilevel model.
As opposed to the network interdiction problem, in our models the operator
aims to maintain the efficiency of the network as much as possible. The efficiency
is here measured as the number of potential travelers that find such network
more attractive than the already existing competing transportation network.
Although the railway network design problem in this paper is based on La-
porte et al. (2010), which in turn is based on Laporte et al. (2011), two main
new contributions from a methodological point of view can be underlined: the
application of dynamic game theory to the problem introduced in Laporte et al.
(2010), and the modeling of a new security resource distribution problem over
a railway network as a Stackelberg game.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to in-
troducing some previous concepts and models. Section 3 studies the problem
of designing a railway transportation network that is robust against an inten-
tional attack assuming that the situation is dynamic (the attacker is allowed to
iteratively place as many bombs as he/she wants) and the only strategy of the
designer is the choice of the network to be built. In Section 4, we assume that
the designer can also choose where to locate a certain amount of security re-
sources over the network. In Section 5, we consider that the network is already
built. In this case the competition takes place between the attacker, who wants
to cause as much damage as possible, and the operator, who can decide where
to set security resources over the network. The paper closes with conclusions
and some pointers at future research.
4
2. Preliminaries
We consider the same railway network design (RND) problem as in Laporte
et al. (2010), which can be summarized as follows. Over a geographical area,
where there already exists a transportation mode (for instance a bus), a railway
system is to be designed or enlarged, with the following input data:
• A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of nodes representing potential sites for stations
is given.
• A set E ⊆ {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N, i < j} of m feasible edges linking the elements
of N is known.
• Every feasible edge (i, j) ∈ E has an associated length dij , which can be
interpreted as the necessary time to traverse the link joining stations i and
j.
• ci is the cost of building a station at node i, i ∈ N , cij is the cost of
building link (i, j) ∈ E. The available budget is limited by Cmax.
• The mobility pattern is given by a matrix G = (gpq) : (p, q) ∈ W, where
W is the ordered index pair set: W = {(p, q) : (p, q) ∈ N}, also referred to
as the set of demands. Therefore, gpq is the expected number of travelers
from station p to station q.
• The generalized cost of satisfying each demand (p, q) by the complemen-
tary mode is vpq. In this application vpq is the time to reach station q
from station p using the competing transportation mode.
Example 1 As an example of our RND problem consider the network depicted
in Figure 1. The network maximizing trip coverage in this example is the one
consisting of the following three lines:
L1 = (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7), L2 = (4, 6, 7), L3 = (6, 8).
Each line is represented by its sorted set of stations. For instance, L2 starts at
node 4, continues to node 6, and ends at node 7. All lines run both ways. The
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trip coverage of a network is calculated as the number of travelers for whom
using the railway network is faster than using the alternative transportation
mode. This problem is proposed and solved in Laporte et al. (2010).
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Figure 1: Test network. Over each edge we have two numbers: the first one is the necessary
cost to build the corresponding edge, the second one is the necessary time to traverse it using
the railway. By each node we have the construction cost of the corresponding station. The
origin destination (O/D) demands gpq and their travel times via the alternative mode vpq for
each demand pair (p, q) ∈ W are given by matrices G and V , see the Appendix.
Our goal is to choose a subset of edges satisfying the budget constraints, so that
a certain objective function is optimized. Examples of such objective functions
are trip coverage (to be maximized) or total traveling time (to be minimized).
Therefore, our RND problem reduces to
max
r∈R
K(r) or min
r∈R
K(r),
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where R is the set of feasible railway networks andK(r) is the objective function
value attained by network r ∈ R.
Unfortunately, not everything always works as planned and therefore the
robustness of the network must be taken into account. In this paper we consider
possible failures in the normal functioning of the transportation network links.
Let K(r, e) be the objective function value of network r if edge e fails (K(r)
denotes the value of network r assuming no failures have occurred). Note that
K(r, e) = K(r) for all e /∈ r. In the rest of the paper we will assume that K is a
function to be maximized by the operator, like the trip coverage of the network.
The reader may note that the minimization case can be studied analogously.
The new objective could be:
1. to maximize (over all possible networks) the worst trip coverage of the
network when one edge unexpectedly fails
max
r∈R
min
e∈E
K(r, e),
(robustness against intentional attacks).
2. to maximize the expected trip coverage,
max
r∈R
{(1−
∑
e∈E
δe)K(r) +
∑
e∈E
δeK(r, e)},
where δe is the probability that edge e randomly fails, which is known,
(robustness against random failures).
The (possibly different) solutions to these problems are railway networks ex-
pressed as a set of railway lines. These networks can be calculated by solving
mixed integer linear programming problems of relatively large size, as shown in
Laporte et al. (2010). In this direction, we note that the effects that removing
edges can provoke in flows are not easily predicted. The same can happen when
removing vertexes, as examined in Martonosi et al. (2011). They identify key
vertexes and analyze the flow passing through them as a way to study network
disruptions.
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2.1. RRND as a game in normal form
In the last section of Laporte et al. (2010) the robust network design problem
against intentional attacks was modeled as a noncooperative two-person zero-
sum game in normal form, where:
1. Players: N = {OPERATOR(PlayerI), ATTACKER(PlayerII)}.
2. Strategies: SOPERATOR = R, SATTACKER = E.
3. Payoffs: vOPERATOR(r, e) = K(r, e) , vATTACKER = −K(r, e).
We note that the number of strategies for the operator can be enormous. In
order to reduce such strategy set, we only consider feasible networks whose
trip coverage, in case no failures occur, is greater than or equal to a minimum
required value. This truncation is realistic because the network to be designed
should, not only be robust, but also (near)optimal in case everything works fine.
Consider the following example.
Example 2 Using the same input data as in Example 1, let us assume that
the minimum acceptable trip coverage is 790. In Table 1, the six best networks
in terms of trip coverage are shown. In order to calculate such networks, we
first calculate r1 by solving the deterministic RND problem, see Appendix A in
Laporte et al. (2010). Network rk+1 is calculated by solving the same problem
imposing that r1, ..., rk are not feasible. Although these problem have been math-
ematically termed NP-hard, see Appendix B in Laporte et al. (2010), for this
instance they are calculated in seconds. These computations, as well as those
in the rest of the paper, were done in GAMS 23, using CPLEX 11.2.1. The
computer used has 3GB of RAM memory, and a 2.4 GHz processor. The sixth
network is dismissed because its trip coverage is lower than the given threshold.
Therefore the operator only has 5 feasible strategies. In principle, the attacker
can choose any of the 13 potential edges.
A saddle point is a strategy (r∗, e∗) that satisfies
K(r∗, e∗) = max
r∈R
min
e∈E
K(r, e) = min
e∈E
max
r∈R
K(r, e) , (1)
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Network Lines Trip coverage Time (seconds)
r1 (1,2,3,5,6,7), (4,6,9), (6,8) 831 14
r2 (2,1,3,5,6,8), (7,4,6,9) 825 25
r3 (1,2,3,5,64,8), (7,4,6,9) 795 39
r4 (1,3,4,7,6,8), (3,5,6,9) 792 42
r5 (1,3,4,6,8), (2,3,5,6,7) 791 43
r6 (1,3,2),(4,3,5,6,8), (6,9) 783 50
Table 1: Optimal networks in terms of trip coverage. For instance, network r1 gives the
highest trip coverage (831). This network is divided into three lines, whose stations are given
within the parentheses in a sorted way.
and (r∗, e∗) is a Nash equilibrium strategy, which means that no player can
benefit by changing its strategy unilaterally.
If no saddle point exists (which is our case) it is possible for players to
enlarge the available set of strategies by considering probability vectors, and
look for a saddle point in the enlarged game, in which players can choose a
convex combination of their pure strategies, thus defining a mixed strategy.
Example 3 Continuing with the same example, Table 2 gives the trip coverage
of each network when each of the potential edges fails. That is, the payoff of
player I. Player II’s payoffs are the opposite. This table has been populated by
solving the robust railway network design problem, see Laporte et al. (2010),
imposing that the corresponding network rk has to be built. Again, although
this problem is NP-hard, for instances of this size the calculation can be done in
seconds, as shown in the last row of the table. The MaxMin strategy (the security
level for player I) is to build network r5, since this way the operator ensures 588
(the minimum is attained when attacking edge (1, 3)). The MinMax strategy (the
security level for the attacker) is to attack edge (6, 8), since this way he ensures
that the trip coverage of the network will not be larger than 615. This maximum
is attained with network r2. Since MaxMin 6= MinMax, no saddle point exists in
pure strategies. In behavioral (mixed) strategies, a saddle-point strategy is given
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e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,4) (3,5) (4,6) (4,7) (5,6) (6,7) (6,8) (6,9) Time
r1 723 831 629 831 569 657 831 490 674 588 647 78
r2 729 596 825 825 548 615 709 461 825 615 641 43
r3 687 795 596 795 536 585 679 457 795 585 611 54
r4 792 599 792 680 577 792 759 579 735 565 625 95
r5 791 588 665 712 670 711 791 655 639 589 791 26
Table 2: Payoffs of player I: trip coverage of network ri when edge ej fails. The MaxMin
and MinMax strategies appear in bold face type. Last column shows computational times (in
seconds) needed to calculate such K(ri, ej) values.
if player I builds r1 with probability 0.025, r2 with probability 0.281 and r5 with
probability 0.694, and player II attacks edge e2 with probability 0.079, edge e10
with probability 0.112 and edge e12 with probability 0.809. All this results in an
expected trip coverage of 596.293 (better than MaxMin for player I).
A normal form (as before) may not provide the full picture of the decision
process, since the order in which players act may be important, as well as the
information they have available at each moment. The extensive form of the two-
person zero-sum game explicitly displays the dynamic character of the decision
problem. In our robust transportation decision process, player I first designs
the network and player II later attacks. In the next section the game will be
represented in extensive form. We shall see that such representation gives a
more realistic picture of the situation.
3. Robust design as a dynamic game
Let r1, ..., rn be the set of possible networks (strategies) for player I, let
e1, ..., em be the set of possible edges (strategies) for player II. Denote by Kij =
K(ri, ej), i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ...,m. Remember that, if ej /∈ ri, then K(ri, ej) =
K(ri). We note as well that we are assuming that the attacker values the
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effect of his/her attacks in a deterministic way. This assumption has been
weakened in the literature. For instance, Nikoofal and Zhuang (2012) allocates
defensive budgets assuming that the attacker’s valuation of targets is unknown
but belongs to bounded intervals. Therefore, for player I there are n possible
actions (strategies), γ1 = ri, i = 1, ..., n. For player II, however, because he
observes the action of player I before deciding his action, there existmn possible
strategies. One such strategy is, for instance, γ2(ri) = e1, for all i = 1, ..., n,
which means to attack edge e1 no matter which network is built. Another
strategy could be γ2(ri) = e1 if i is even and γ2(ri) = e2 otherwise. In Figure
2, a representation of a one-stage game with its information sets is shown.
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Figure 2: Our example game as a single-act game in extensive form
If we denote by J(γ1, γ2) the payoff of player I when player I and player II
employ the strategies γ1 and γ2, respectively, we say that {γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2} is in saddle-
point equilibrium if
J(γ1, γ
∗
2 ) ≤ J(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 ) ≤ J(γ
∗
1 , γ2),
and J∗ = J(γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ) is known as the saddle-point value of the game.
One way to find a saddle point of the game in extensive form consists of
first transforming the game into one in normal form, to then find a saddle-point
strategy. Unfortunately, this may lead us to an enormous matrix game (in
our case, an n×mn matrix). Instead, the method for obtaining a pure strategy
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saddle-point of single-act zero-sum games in extensive form in Basar and Olsder
(1999) will be adapted, resulting in the following procedure.
Proposition 1 For the previously defined dynamic game, the following proce-
dure provides a saddle-point equilibrium. Such equilibrium coincides with the
MaxMin strategy for the operator.
1. For each feasible network ri, let ji such that Ki,ji = minj Kij .
2. Let i∗ such that Ki∗,ji∗ = maxiKi,ji .
3. γ∗1 = ri∗ is the saddle-point strategy of player I (the network operator).
4. γ∗2 (ri) = eji∗ is the saddle-point strategy of player II (the attacker).
{γ∗1 , γ
∗
2} is the saddle-point strategy of the game, leading to the actions u
1 =
ri∗ , u
2 = eji∗ . The value of the game is K(ri∗ , eji∗ ).
Proof. The process leads to a saddle-point equilibrium because it is a
mere adaptation of that in Basar and Olsder (1999). Note that K(ri∗ , eji∗ ) =
maxiK(ri, eji) = maximinj K(ri, ej), which is the MaxMin strategy defined
before (security level for player I). 
Remark 1 A more realistic picture could be modeled by allowing that, once the
network is built, the attacker can place bombs more than once. Zero-sum games
in which at least one player is allowed to act more than once, and with possibly
different information sets at each level of play, are known as multi-act zero-sum
games. Within this class, our game belongs to the subclass of feedback games,
which satisfy:
1. at the time of his action, each player has perfect information concerning
the current level of play.
2. information sets of the first-acting player (what he knows about the situa-
tion of the game at each moment) at every level of play are singletons, and
the information sets of the second-acting player at every level of play are
such that none of them include nodes corresponding to branches emanating
from two or more different information sets of the other player.
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Note that the designer/operator cannot redesign the network at will, because
designing and building a railway network is too expensive. Therefore his strate-
gies must be the same at every stage of the game.
There is a recursive procedure to determine the saddle-point strategies of a
feedback game, see Basar and Olsder (1999). It is easy to see that this procedure
leads to player I choosing network ri∗ and player II attacking edge ei∗ at each
stage of the game. Note that in the multi-stage representation of our game,
saddle-point strategies are merely a repetition of the minmax strategies calcu-
lated for the former one-stage game. In any case, both approaches represent an
advance over the normal form representation where most of the times we have
to resort to mixed strategies to represent equilibria. Such mixed strategies are
very hard to implement and to explain to designers/managers.
4. A joint model for network design and security resource allocation
In this section we propose a more general game in which player I, the op-
erator, can distribute a certain number of security guards X ∈ Z+ over the
edges. Then, the set of strategies of player I is defined as (ri, x), where ri is the
network to be built and x ∈ Zm+ is the distribution of security guards, where xj
is the number of guards assigned to edge ej , satisfying that
∑m
j=1 xj ≤ X. We
will assume that the probability for an attack made by player II over a certain
edge to be successful is a decreasing function on the number of guards located
on that edge. Therefore, let K((ri, x), ej) be the expected trip coverage of net-
work ri when edge ej is attacked and player I distributes its security resources
according to x.
As we have justified in the previous section, if player II has perfect informa-
tion about the strategy followed by player I (which network has been built and
which is the security distribution along the edges) before an attack, the best
player I can do is to build its security level strategy, which consists of finding a
network r¯ and a security guard vector x¯ such that
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max
(ri,x)
min
ej
K((ri, x), ej) = min
ej
K((r¯, x¯), ej).
This problem can be modeled as:
max zmin + α
∑n
i=1 zi + β
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1K((ri, xi), ej)
s.t.: K((ri, xi), ej) ≥ zi, i = 1, ..., n
zmin ≤ zi, i = 1, ..., n∑m
j=1 xij ≤ X, i = 1, ..., n
xij ∈ Z+, i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ...,m
(2)
where xij is the number of guards to be located on edge ej if ri is built, zi is
the minimum trip coverage of network ri when one of the edges fails, and zmin
is the minimum zi.
Note the second term in the objective function, which makes the maximiza-
tion of the average minimum trip coverage of a network when edges are attacked
a second objective, and the third term, which makes the average security a third
objective. Therefore α and β are small positive numbers with α≫ β.
Remark
An instance of K((ri, xi), ej) could be the following. Assume that, if no
guards are located on an edge, then the probability of an attack on such edge
to be successful is 1, whereas if there are uj guards the probability of success is
0. Assuming that having a number of guards between 0 and uj decreases the
probability of success linearly, we end up with:
K((ri, x), ej) =


K(ri, ej) if xij = 0
K(ri, ej) +
xij
uj
(K(ri)−K(ri, ej)) if 0 < xij < uj
K(ri) if xij ≥ uj .
Therefore, problem (2) can be written as a mixed integer linear programming
problem as follows:
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x (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,4) (3,5) (4,6) (4,7) (5,6) (6,7) (6,8) (6,9)
r1 3 0 7 0 8 6 0 8 5 7 6
r2 3 7 0 0 8 7 4 8 0 7 6
r3 3 0 7 0 8 7 4 8 0 7 6
r4 0 8 0 6 8 0 0 8 3 9 8
r5 0 8 6 4 6 4 0 7 7 8 0
Table 3: Optimal values of variables xij .
max zmin + α
∑n
i=1 zi + β
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1
xij
uj
(K(ri)−K(ri, ej))
s.t.: K(ri, ej) +
xij
uj
(K(ri)−K(ri, ej)) ≥ zi, i = 1, ..., n
zmin ≤ zi, i = 1, ..., n∑m
j=1 xij ≤ X, i = 1, ..., n
xij ≤ uj , i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ...,m
xij ∈ Z+, i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ...,m
(3)
Example 4 As an example of this situation, consider the same network as
before, and assume that for any of the links, having 10 security guards guarantees
total security and, therefore, no attack is to be successful. Consider as well that
the number of guards available is X = 50. With this data, a solution to Problem
(3) taking α = 10−4 and β = 10−7 is given in Table 3, whereas the expected trip
coverage of each network when each of the feasible links is attacked and guards
are distributed according to Table 3 is shown in Table 4. We note that both
tables are obtained from the solution to problem (3), which is solved in around
0.2 seconds. Note as well that for solving this problem one needs the data given
in tables 1 and 2.
The minimum expected coverage for each potential network when one of the
edges fails is: z1 = 752.5, z2 = 751.4, z3 = 719.4, z4 = 747.2, z5 = 740.6, and
therefore the security strategy for player I is to build network r1 with the secu-
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K (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,4) (3,5) (4,6) (4,7) (5,6) (6,7) (6,8) (6,9)
r1 755.4 831.0 770.4 831.0 778.6 761.4 831.0 762.8 752.5 758.1 757.4
r2 757.8 756.3 825.0 825.0 769.6 762.0 755.4 752.2 825.0 762.0 751.4
r3 719.4 795.0 735.3 795.0 743.2 732.0 725.4 727.4 795.0 732.0 721.4
r4 792.0 753.4 792.0 747.2 749.0 792.0 759.0 749.4 752.1 769.3 758.6
r5 791.0 750.4 740.6 743.6 742.6 743.0 791.0 750.2 745.4 750.6 791.0
Table 4: Values of expected trip coverage K((ri, xi), ej) assuming the values of xi as given in
Table 3.
rity distribution showed in Table 3. This way the operator ensures an expected
trip coverage of, at least, 752.5 (no matter which edge the attacker decides to
attack). Note that in this case the attacker would prefer to attack edge (6,7),
since an attack in this edge would produce the highest expected damage in the
ridership. Therefore the actions ((r1, (3, 0, 7, 0, 8, 6, 0, 8, 5, 7, 6)), (6, 7)) derive a
saddle-point strategy.
Note again that the optimal strategies for player I are MaxMin strategies,
but the corresponding solution network need not be the same as in the games
presented in Section 3 (note that these models applied to our example resulted
in network r5 as the MaxMin strategy for the operator).
5. A model for security resource allocation
In this section we assume that the operator has already built network r, but
still the competition game between the operator and the attacker continues.
The operator can now install a security system over the network that is difficult
to modify and known by the attacker. Therefore this situation is modeled as
a Stackelberg game in which the operator is the leader and the attacker is the
follower.
Following the work in Bakir (2011), we now propose a problem in which
the attacker wants to locate a bomb so that the maximum damage is caused
to the network, and the operator wants to design a security system that allows
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interdicting the possible attacks. Let Kj be the cost incurred by the operator if
a bomb is successfully detonated on edge ej , and let pj ∈ [0, 1] be the probability
that a bomb located on edge ej is interdicted (both parameters are known by
the players). The cost to keep this probability is c(pj) =
dj
(1−pj)
αj − dj , where
c(pj) can represent, for instance, the investment in a security system to interdict
a bomb on edge ej with probability pj , and dj is the length of edge ej. This
cost function, as noted in Bakir (2011) and Bier et al. (2007), has some nice
properties (c(0) = 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, limpj→1 c(pj) = +∞). Assuming that the
attacker tries to locate a bomb where his expected payoff is maximized, that is,
on edge ej′ : j
′ = argmaxj{(1− pj)Kj}, the defender’s objective is to minimize
min
∑m
j=1 c(pj) + (1− pj′)Kj′
s.t.: (1 − pj)Kj ≤ (1− pj′)Kj′ ∀ j = 1, ...,m, j 6= j
′
pj ∈ [0, 1].
(4)
Note that, in order to solve this problem, we first have to find out which
edge ej′ is. A first idea using brute force would be to solve problem (4) for
any possible edge ej′ , which does not seem to be an appropriate method. The
following theorem provides a more suitable way for finding an equilibrium of
this game. We will prove that, whenever the costs incurred by the operator
when one bomb explodes are sufficiently large (which is a logical assumption)
the equilibrium of this game is for the operator to choose its security system so
that the expected cost of not interdicting a bomb is constant for every edge.
Theorem 1 Consider an instance of the Stackelberg game defined in this sec-
tion. If Kj is sufficiently large for all ej, the equilibrium is for the operator to
choose the interdiction probabilities pj so that (1− pj)Kj is constant for all j.
Proof. Consider the problem in (4). For convenience, define a new variable
z = (1 − pj′)Kj′ . Let us apply the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for
this problem, see Bazaraa et al. (1979). The KKT conditions are necessary
conditions for optimality. Because the objective function is convex, and the
constraints are linear, KKT conditions are also sufficient.
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The Lagrangean function of problem (4) is:
L(p1, ..., pm, z, λ1, ..., λm) =
m∑
j=1
(
dj
(1− pj)αj
− dj) + z +
m∑
j=1
((1− pj)Kj − z)λj .
The KKT conditions for this case consist of solving the following system of
equations:
∂L
∂pj
=
αjdj
(1− pj)αj+1
−Kjλj = 0. (5)
1−
m∑
j=1
λj = 0. (6)
If (1 − pj)Kj is constant for all ej , in particular we have that (1 − pj)Kj =
z∗ ∀ j = 1, ...,m (or equivalently pj = 1 −
z∗
Kj
). Therefore a solution to the
previous system of equations satisfies:
λ∗j =
αjdj
Kj(z∗/Kj)αj+1
, (7)
m∑
j=1
αjdj
Kj(z∗/Kj)αj+1
= 1, (8)
p∗j = 1−
z∗
Kj
. (9)
We first see that the value of z∗ is well defined. Let f(z) =
∑m
j=1
αjdj
Kj(z/Kj)
αj+1
.
It is easy to see that limz→∞ f(z) = 0, limz→0+ f(z) = +∞, and that f is a
continuous function in (0,+∞). Applying Bolzano’s theorem we get that there
exixts z∗ ∈ (0,+∞) so that f(z∗) = 1. For p∗j to be well defined, we need to
impose 0 ≤ p∗j < 1 (note that by the definition of the cost function c(·) we have
that pj 6= 1), which is guaranteed if Kj > z
∗ or, as we stated in the hypotheses
of the theorem, Kj is sufficiently large for every j.

In other words, this theorem says that if the costs provoked by the attack
are large enough, then what the operator should do is to balance its expected
loss at all edges, so that the maximum damage is minimized. Note as well that
if the costs Kj are small enough, not doing anything might be optimal (that is,
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make all pj = 0). It goes without saying that the incurred costs for the operator
in case we are facing a terrorist attack (Kj) are large enough, and therefore
Theorem 1 is valid for these situations. Let us see an example of the application
of this result.
Example 5 Assume the operator has already designed network r1 as defined in
Example 2 and suggested in Example 4, and assume as well that the loss incurred
by the operator if a bomb explodes in edge ej is Kj = 1000(K(r1)−K(r1, ej)) =
831000 − 1000K(r1, ej) (the values of K(r1, ej) are shown in Table 2.) The
choice of dj and αj is constant and equal to 1 for every j. As a conclusion to
the previous theorem, the reader may note that an optimal solution to problem
min
∑m
j=1 c(pj) + z
s.t.: (1− pj)Kj ≤ z ∀ j = 1, ...,m
pj ∈ [0, 1]
(10)
coincides with the solution to Problem 4 for any j′, and is:
p∗1 = 0.988, p
∗
3 = 0.994, p
∗
5 = 0.995, p
∗
6 = 0.993, p
∗
8 = 0.996,
p∗9 = 0.992, p
∗
10 = 0.995, p
∗
11 = 0.993, z
∗ = 1292.672 = Kj(1− pj) ∀ j,
with an optimal value of 2577.343. This optimal value is the cost incurred by
the operator if the attacker explodes the bomb at any edge plus the cost to keep
probabilities p∗j . The execution time for this non-linear programming problem,
using CONOPT with GAMS 23, is around 0.2 seconds.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have extended some previously introduced models about the
competition between a transportation network operator and an attacker. The
operator wants to design a network that optimizes certain objective function
and the attacker wants to produce as much damage in the network as possible
by placing a bomb on one of the network links. This situation is modeled as a
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two-player non-cooperative game in which player I is the network operator and
player II is the attacker. The strategies for player I are the possible networks
to be built and the strategies for player II are the edges that can be attacked.
The first idea expressed here is that the models presented in previous papers
miss the dynamic aspects of these situations: the attacker can attack many
times. We have proven that, in the dynamic version of the game, the best
strategy for the operator is to design a network that optimizes the worst case
scenario.
We have also proposed variations of this game, in which the operator can
manage the security system in the network. The first model assumes that the
strategies for the operator are the possible networks to be built and a distribu-
tion of security guards over the network, the strategies for player II remain the
same: the set of network edges. We have modeled this situation as a mathe-
matical mixed integer programming problem that, depending on the function
that models the probability of success in the attacks of player II, can be linear.
An example has shown that the resulting network need not be the same as in
the dynamic model presented before, where the only strategies for the operator
where which network to build.
The last model introduced in this paper assumes that the network has al-
ready been built and that the possible strategies for player I are the investment
on a security system: the more you invest in one particular edge, the less likely
to be successful an attack on this edge is. This model assumes that the security
system cannot be changed easily and, therefore, in the dynamic version of the
game player I has to restrict to the same strategy at all the stages. So this
situation has been modeled as a Stackelberg game. We have proven that an
optimal strategy for the operator is to distribute the security efforts in such a
way that the expected cost incurred by the operator does not depend on the
attacker’s targeted edge.
This research line is still in progress, specially from the algorithmic point
of view. The applicability of the models presented to real-sized transportation
networks is still an open issue. Calculating the payoff function is an NP-hard
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problem. For this reason a first set of heuristics has been proposed in Garcia-
Archilla et al. (2011). Note that the application of heuristics would yield an
approximation of the payoff function, and the interesting research line of ap-
proximated games, in which the characteristic or payoff function is approxi-
mated would apply, see Perea (2011). Further research will focus on efficient
algorithms that help finding equilibria in the models presented.
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Appendix: Matrices in example
G =


0 9 26 19 13 12 4 6 4
11 0 14 26 7 18 3 7 9
30 19 0 30 24 8 3 9 11
21 9 11 0 22 16 21 18 16
14 14 8 9 0 20 12 18 9
26 1 22 24 13 0 11 28 21
7 5 6 19 15 13 0 16 14
5 9 11 16 17 25 17 0 21
6 8 10 18 11 20 14 20 0


;
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V =


0 1.6 0.8 2 1.6 2.5 4 3.6 4.6
2 0 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.5 3.2 3.5 4.5
1.5 1.4 0 1.3 0.9 2 3.3 2.9 3.9
1.9 2 1.9 0 1.8 2 2 3.8 4.1
3 1.5 2 2 0 1.5 3 2 3
2.1 2.7 2.2 1 1.5 0 2.5 3 2.5
3.9 3.9 3.9 2 3 2.5 0 2.5 2.5
5 3.5 4 4 2 3 2.5 0 2.5
4.6 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 0


.
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